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Abstract in English 
Frisch and Tinbergen founded the standard framework for finding the optimal economic policy 
by maximizing the welfare function under constraints supplied by the econometric model. 
Frisch worried about the reliability of the model and Tinbergen thought that it would be too 
difficult to specify the welfare function. Looking at current practice in Dutch policy making, 
both worries are relevant but the solutions proposed by the founders are not very helpful. 
Rather, the solution is found in applying an iterative trial-and-error procedure interfacing 
between the policy maker and the model-cum-expert system. The main contributions of the 
standard framework are its useful set of concepts, the famous order condition for a feasible 
solution, and the clear definition of role models for the two parties in the interaction. 
 
Key words: macroeconomic models, policy choice, policy vigour, reliability, uncertainty, 
welfare function 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
Frisch en Tinbergen hebben de grondslag gelegd voor het standaard raamwerk om het optimale 
economische beleid af te leiden uit het maximeren van de welvaartsfunctie onder restricties die 
beschreven worden door het econometrische model. Frisch maakte zich zorgen over de 
betrouwbaarheid van het model en Tinbergen meende dat het te moeilijk zou zijn om de 
welvaartsfunctie te bepalen. In de hedendaagse praktijk van de beleidsvoorbereiding in 
Nederland blijken beide punten van zorg terecht, maar de oplossingen die door de grondleggers 
zijn voorgesteld, blijken niet erg behulpzaam. De oplossing wordt eerder gevonden in de 
herhaalde toepassing van een trial-and-error procedure die vorm geeft aan de communicatie 
tussen de beleidsmaker en het model met de bijbehorende expertise. De belangrijkste bijdragen 
van het standaard raamwerk zijn de nuttige concepten die het hanteert, de bekende orde-
voorwaarde voor het bestaan van een oplossing, en de heldere definitie van rolmodellen voor de 
beleidsmaker en de expert. 
Steekwoorden: macro-economische modellen, beleidskeuze, beleidskracht, betrouwbaarheid, 
onzekerheid, welvaartsfunctie 
 
Een uitgebreide Nederlandstalige samenvatting is beschikbaar via www.cpb.nl. 
  4  
  5 
Table of contents 
Abstracts in English and in Dutch  3 
Table of contents  5 
Summary  7 
1  Introduction  9 
2  Theory  11 
2.1  Reliability of behavioural equations  11 
2.2  The unknown welfare function  12 
2.3  Uncertainty  13 
3  Practice  15 
3.1  Usefulness and reliability of large models  15 
3.2  Getting to know the welfare function  18 
3.3  Handling uncertainty  19 
4  What makes the theory useful  21 
4.1  Illustrations from recent experience in the Netherlands  21 
4.2  Priorities for improvement in the Dutch case  24 
5  Conclusions  25 
References  27 
  
  6  
  7 
Summary 
According to the standard framework, optimal economic policy is found by maximizing the 
welfare function under constraints supplied by the econometric model. Frisch and Tinbergen, 
the two founders of this framework, both worried about its practical usefulness. 
Frisch worried about the reliability of the econometric model for the purpose of giving 
policy advice. In particular, he felt that the behavioural equations could be unnecessarily 
restrictive for finding the best policy. If it is to be used for supporting policy decision making, a 
model should contain only “autonomous relations”, defined as relations which can be expected 
to remain invariant under any change in the rest of the model. Because many behavioural 
equations cannot be expected to remain invariant under fundamental changes in institutions, 
these equations are unreliable if such institutional changes are among the policy decisions that 
one is willing to consider. This may be read as an early statement of the famous Lucas critique. 
Frisch proposed to solve the policy problem in two stages. In the selection phase, the welfare 
function is maximized under a subset of model equations, comprising only of definitions, 
accounting identities and technical limitations. This yields the best vector of targets in the set of 
physically possible results. Next, in the implementation phase, one tries to find the policy 
instruments that bring the economy as close as possible to the selected targets. 
Tinbergen thought that in practice it would be too difficult to specify the welfare function 
which the optimal policy is supposed to maximize. This welfare function should reflect 
collective preferences over different states of the economy. It should not only depend on the 
individual utility functions of the citizens, but also on a certain way of combining and hence 
weighing these individual interests. As a short-cut solution, Tinbergen assumes that 
policymakers choose some fixed targets instead. 
The formal treatment of uncertainty in the standard framework is largely due to Theil, who 
derived the famous certainty equivalence result: Under specific conditions, maximum expected 
welfare is obtained for the policy vector that maximizes welfare under certainty, substituting 
expected values for the uncertain elements. Unfortunately the conditions are unlikely to be met 
in macroeconomic applications. For policy analysis, the crucial uncertainties relate to the 
impact multipliers and the specification of the model. Brainard and Don have shown that an 
increase in uncertainty about the impact multipliers reduces the vigour of the optimal policy. 
 
Looking at current practice in Dutch policy making, the worries of Frisch and Tinbergen both 
are relevant but the solutions proposed by them are not very helpful. Rather, the solution for 
both problems is found in applying an iterative trial-and-error procedure interfacing between the 
policy maker and the model-cum-expert system. Policy makers suggest a particular combination 
of instrument values, which is analyzed and translated into model input by the professional 
model user. The model results are supplemented by the expert and translated for the policy 
makers. The report is likely to lead to analytical questions and a discussion between policy  
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makers and experts, both on the quality of the analysis and on possible improvements of the 
policy proposals. A revised policy is then submitted to the experts for a fresh analysis. 
The main contributions of the standard framework are its useful set of concepts, the famous 
order condition for a feasible solution, and the clear definition of role models for the two parties 
in the interaction. The distinction between target variables and instrument variables is crucial 
for any useful interaction between policy makers and experts. The same holds true for the 
concept of a welfare function describing the preferences of policy makers and an econometric 
model describing the relations between instruments and targets. The order condition, stating that 
a policy problem may only be solved if the number of instruments is at least as large as the 
number of targets, proves very useful in the interaction. And it is important that both parties in 
the interaction observe the responsibilities that are defined by the role models: the policy maker 
decides on the welfare function and ultimately chooses the instrument values that will be 
implemented; the expert decides on the model relations and determines the forecast for the 
target variables once the instrument values have been chosen. 
Uncertainty in the baseline scenario is readily communicated to the policy makers and has 
been taken explicitly into account over the last decade in preparing Dutch fiscal policy. Perhaps 
the difficulties in assessing actual parameter uncertainty are an important obstacle in adjusting 
policy vigour to parameter certainty. In practice, policy vigour may well be determined by other 
considerations, ranging from primitive feelings that “something must be done” to sophisticated 
political strategies and the expected impact on public opinion. 
 
 The first priority for improving current practice in the Netherlands is extending the scope of the 
econometric models. In particular, we need sound estimates of the structural economic effects 
of government programs in education, infrastructure, health, etc. In addition, we should work on 
models suited to evaluate more policy options in changing institutions. The second priority is to 
find a proper way of determining and communicating the uncertainty inherent in any particular 
piece of policy analysis. There is no need for a new type of method for policy support. 
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1  Introduction 
Frisch (1950) and Tinbergen (1952) established the theory of economic policy which still 
provides the standard textbook framework for discussing how econometric models are used to 
help policy makers.
1  However, Frisch and Tinbergen themselves noted that for a number of 
reasons the standard framework would be difficult to apply in practice. Frisch worried about the 
reliability of the econometric model for the purpose of giving policy advice. In particular, the 
behavioural equations could be unnecessarily restrictive for finding the best policy. Tinbergen 
felt that specifying a welfare function to be maximized is a difficult matter, which in practice 
would often be passed over by directly choosing a number of fixed targets. 
This paper confronts the standard framework and these early worries with current practice in 
Dutch policy making. It shows that the worries of Frisch and Tinbergen were well founded, but 
that the solutions they suggested are not very helpful in practice. In practice, other ways have 
been found to solve their problems. 
Current practice of using econometric models in Dutch policy making, as described below, 
shows many similarities with current practice elsewhere. Related accounts of policy support in 
practice may be found in Bray et al. (1995) and the collected papers edited by Britton (1989) 
and Den Butter and Morgan (2000). 
 
1 For Frisch’s views, I should also refer to Frisch (1962) and the account given by Leif Johansen (1977). For Tinbergen, the 
prime source is Tinbergen (1952), where he is more explicit on the welfare function and its practical limitations than in most 
later work.  
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2  Theory 
The framework for the theory of optimal economic policy was established by Frisch (1950) and 
Tinbergen (1952). The basic setup is quite simple. With y a vector of target variables, x a vector 
of policy instrument variables and z a vector of other (exogenous) variables, the econometric 
model is assumed to provide us with a function f describing what value of the target vector y 
results from a particular instrument vector x, under given values for the other variables z, i.e. 
 
(1)  y = f (x, z). 
The policy problem then is to maximize a welfare function (or preference function) W of the 
target variables subject to the restrictions given by the econometric model, i.e.  
 
(2)  max W(y)  subject to  y = f (x, z)  for given z 
Both Frisch and Tinbergen noted that this simple setup would be difficult to apply in practice. 
Therefore they came up with adjustments designed to overcome practical problems in 
implementation. Interestingly, their worries went in different directions. 
2.1  Reliability of behavioural equations 
Frisch (1950) stresses that a model should only contain “autonomous relations” if it is to be 
used for supporting policy decisions. A relation is said to be autonomous if it can be expected to 
remain invariant under any change in the rest of the model (Frisch 1950, p. 485).
2 Because 
many behavioural equations cannot be expected to remain invariant under fundamental changes 
in institutions, they are not reliable if such institutional changes are among the policy decisions 
that one is willing to consider.
3  By imposing such unreliable equations as restrictions in the 
policy optimization, one could miss opportunities for a better result. Indeed, Johansen (1977) 
explains that the welfare function should be maximized under a subset of restrictions, 
comprising only of definitions, accounting identities and technical limitations. Thus one would 
select the best vector of targets in the set of “physically possible results”. Only after this 
“selection phase” one should proceed to the “implementation phase”, which consists of finding 
the set of policy instruments that can bring the economy as close as possible to the selected 
target vector. The latter phase calls for creative policy ideas, including institutional changes that 
may affect the behavioural relations. In this context, finding the best policy is characterized by 
interaction with the policy makers and the procedure is by trial and error rather than mechanical 
 
2 In his Econometrica study, Haavelmo (1944) explicitly acknowledges Frisch as the originator of this concept of autonomy. 
3 Note that a model containing only autonomous relations is immune to the Lucas critique. We return to this issue in section 
3.1 below.  
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optimization. The model relations are accepted only if they do not unnecessarily preclude 
reaching the best possible result. 
In contrast, Tinbergen (1952) relies on all model equations in finding the optimal instrument 
vector. But he states clearly that his method is restricted to the determination of “quantitative 
policies”. This rules out “qualitative policies” and “reforms”, which affect the institutional 
structure and hence the model relations. The study of such policies is more difficult and 
explicitly outside the scope of his 1952 contribution. In Tinbergen (1956) he devotes one 
chapters to qualitative policies, defined as changes in structure “within given foundations”. 
Thus chapter 5 studies built-in stabilizers, changes in pricing and taxation schemes, monopolies, 
decentralization or centralization in administration and the appraisal of investment projects. 
Chapter 6 discusses several types of reforms, defined as “changes in foundations”. Both types 
of policy questions can be handled in the standard framework, provided the model is 
sufficiently broad to encompass the relevant policy options. In practice, it requires dedicated 
models to study various types of institutional change. As Tinbergen (1952, p. 72) noted, such 
problems meet with great difficulties, mainly because “our empirical quantitative knowledge of 
human behaviour under different structural conditions is so restricted” and he warns against 
speculative and biased solutions. 
2.2  The unknown welfare function 
Tinbergen expects that the standard framework cannot be applied because in practice the 
welfare function W is unknown. This function reflects collective preferences over different 
states of the economy. It should not only depend on the individual utility functions of the 
citizens, but also on a certain way of combining and hence weighing these individual interests. 
Right at the start Tinbergen states that the specification (“fixation”) of the welfare function is “a 
difficult matter; generally it will not be considered consciously but intuitively by those 
responsible for the policy. (…) In practice the stage of fixing (W) and trying to maximise it will 
often be passed over and the targets y chosen directly” (Tinbergen 1952, p. 2-3). So as short-cut 
solution, he proposes to choose a fixed target vector y* and replace (2) by 
 
(3)  solve  y* = f (x, z)  for x  at given z 
 
This will yield the corresponding instrument values. Tinbergen anticipates that the result will 
not prove satisfactory, because it will violate either some technical constraints (nonnegative 
prices, technical possibilities) or some social or political constraints. Hence a critical discussion 
will give rise to various boundary conditions that must be observed and Tinbergen then goes on 
to discuss their inclusion in the procedure to find the proper instrument vector. If the solution to 
(3) violates technical constraints, clearly the model (1) is incomplete or only locally valid. If the 
solution violates political constraints, the replacement of the welfare function W by a fixed set  
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of targets y* was inadequate. In both cases, what follows is a trial-and-error procedure which is 
intended to successively incorporate all relevant constraints. Of course, the policy maker could 
also suggest a different target vector, but apparently that option is less interesting from 
Tinbergen’s point of view. 
Replacing the maximization of W(y) by fixing the target vector y* turns the policy problem 
(2) into a set of equations (3). Of course existence of a solution (for arbitrary y)
4  requires the 
famous order condition
5, i.e. the number of instrument variables should be at least as large as 
the number of target variables, i.e. dim x ≥ dim y.  
 
Frisch is well aware that the specification of the welfare function is no easy matter. Indeed he 
has worked a lot on both the theoretical and practical aspects and he reached a rather definite 
opinion, based not least on extensive interviews with leading policy makers: “I am convinced 
that the preference function problem for an economy at large can be solved when it is 
approached in an intelligent and cautious way” (Frisch 1962, p. 255). Yet, it cannot be 
formulated in one stroke, but should be found “through a series of attempts based on continuous 
cooperation between the responsible authorities and the analytical experts” (ibidem).  
2.3  Uncertainty 
The formal treatment of uncertainty in the present context was developed by Theil (1954, 
1958). He derived the famous certainty equivalence result, stating that under certain conditions, 
maximum expected welfare is obtained for the policy vector that maximizes welfare under 
certainty, substituting expected values for the uncertain elements. 
One important condition for certainty equivalence is that the welfare function is quadratic in 
the target variables. This condition is unlikely to be met in macroeconomics, even symmetry is 
unlikely to hold as policy makers tend to get into deeper trouble in case of setbacks than in case 
of windfalls. This relates to the time lags involved in determining the relevant economic 
variables and in adjusting policy decisions to new information. Setbacks are more difficult to 
handle than windfalls. As a result, certainty equivalence is not very helpful in macroeconomic 
policy practice;
6 see also the discussion in Don (2001a). 
In addition, the certainty equivalence conditions exclude uncertainty in the (multiplicative) 
model coefficients which relate the targets to the instruments. Even in a static linear-quadratic 
optimization model, uncertainty about the impact multipliers does affect optimal policy. Here 
the seminal result is that of Brainard (1967), who showed that in the single target, single 
 
4 If the order condition is not satisfied, the set of reachable target vectors is only a subset of the space of possible target 
vectors. In that case a solution exists only for target vectors in the reachable subset. 
5 The order condition is necessary but not sufficient. To ensure sufficiency, it should be supplemented by a rank condition. 
6 The parametric certainty equivalence procedures proposed by Johansen (1980) allow for particular forms of risk aversion 
and asymmetry. They lead to the maximization of some linear combination of expected welfare and its variance, which 
cannot handle the asymmetry indicated in the text.  
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instrument case an increase in the uncertainty about the impact multiplier reduces the vigour of 
the optimal policy. For a high level of uncertainty, this confirms the old adage “when in doubt, 
abstain”. Don (1983) provided an unconditional generalization to the multidimensional case. 
Frisch probably considered these uncertainties as a minor issue, compared to the major issue 
of model reliability discussed above. Tinbergen (1954) did worry about uncertainty in the 
impact multipliers. He explained that information from different sources helped to reduce 
parameter uncertainty. In addition he suggested to perform sensitivity analyses with respect to 
those parameters that were considered to be less certain. Indeed, he did exactly that in 
Tinbergen (1952, p.60-61) for a small macroeconomic model. Targeting production and the 
balance of payments with government expenditures and the exchange rate, he studied the 
sensitivity of the optimal policy with respect to four model parameters: the marginal propensity 
to spend, the price elasticities of imports and exports, and the marginal wage quota (share of 
labour costs).  
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3  Practice 
How do econometric models in fact help policy makers? Does the simple setup as described by 
(1) prove useful in practice? How important are Frisch’s worries about the reliability of the 
model and Tinbergen’s worries about knowledge of the welfare function, and how workable are 
their suggestions to cope with these practical problems? 
 
The simple setup works fine for relatively small and simple models. There it helps exploring the 
trade-offs that policy makers face. In a multi-player setting the simple setup provides a good 
framework for studying the characteristics of the policy game. Players may be different policy-
making bodies in a single country (government, central bank, trade unions) or different national 
governments in a multi-country setting. 
However, such studies are mainly used to get a general idea of the type of dilemmas and 
choices that the policy makers face. While small models can capture the characteristics of a 
particular policy problem, they are necessarily incomplete and often unsuitable for guiding 
actual policy choices.
7  Real policy making tends to draw on larger and more sophisticated 
models, that more accurately describe the institutional setting and the range of specific policy 
instruments. Such “large” models are required to cope with the complex interdependencies in 
the real economy in a way that is accountable, traceable and consistent .
8 So let us see how the 
ideas of Frisch and Tinbergen apply to a realistic policy problem in the context of a “large” 
empirical econometric model. 
3.1  Usefulness and reliability of large models 
Models are simplifications of reality. As Tinbergen wrote in 1936: 
“To get a clear view, things must be stylized. The many phenomena must be grouped in such a 
way that the picture becomes clear, yet without losing its characteristic traits. (…) Some have 
made stylized pictures that were unwieldy. Some have made stylized pictures that were 
unrealistic. But things must be stylized. The alternative is barrenness”.  
(from the Dutch original in Tinbergen (1936);
9  translation by the present author) 
 
Tinbergen writes about stylized pictures rather than simplified pictures. This indicates that the 
simplification of reality should be well structured: it should obey some set of rules, constituting 
a scholarly style. Rules are readily offered by economic theory, logic and the relevant 
 
7 Unlike one or two decades ago, it now seems to be taken for granted that real world decision support for macroeconomic 
policy requires the use of large models, e.g. Pagan (2003) and Sims (2002). 
8 To illustrate, the coalition agreement reached by three Dutch political parties in May 2003 counted about 60 different 
economic policy measures (CPB, 2003b, appendix A). In an intermediate analysis, these were translated into changes in 
about 30 exogenous variables of the JADE model, see CPB (2003a). 
9 The full text of this paper is available in English under the name “An economic policy for 1936”, in Klaassen, Koyck and 
Witteveen (eds., 1959), pp. 37-84. There the quoted phrases are found on p. 41.  
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accounting system. This is how a model provides consistency with economic theory. In 
addition, using a model provides consistency over time. Taking possible changes in the model 
into account, the present model analysis is consistent with earlier analyses. 
The stylized picture must be manageable and realistic. Of course, the size of models that can 
be managed nowadays is much larger than in 1936 or 1952. Indeed models have grown larger to 
enhance their realism. But still they are simplifications, leaving out elements that are considered 
to be inessential for the problems at hand. There are no models suitable for all economic policy 
problems. Different models are built for different purposes. For empirical macroeconomic 
models, the restriction on size nowadays does not come from limitations in computing power, 
but from what can be traced and understood by the user and the client. Black boxes are useless. 
If the model user cannot explain the results, his clients will not trust the analysis. Indeed, the 
model should offer a clear view on the relevant phenomena and their interaction. The user must 
be accountable for the model analysis to his colleagues and clients. He must be able to trace and 
understand the model results. For more complex models, this requires a knowledgeable user and 
sophisticated communication with the clients. 
 
How about reliability? Being only a stylized picture, the model is always incomplete. 
Phenomena that were considered inessential at the model building stage, may prove to be 
important in a particular application. Hence the professional user must be aware of the 
limitations of the model and be ready to adjust the model or supplement the model analysis to 
cope with relevant issues outside the scope of the standard model version.
10  Often the 
incompleteness also means the omission of alternative institutional arrangements. Unless the 
model was built to help with problems of institutional design, it is likely to take the current 
institutional setup as given. This common situation rules out using the model for analysing what 
Tinbergen called qualitative policies and reforms. 
Wherever the model goes beyond accounting identities, uncertainties creep in. Behavioural 
relations are not known with precision, but have been estimated and therefore are subject to 
uncertainty. Additional uncertainty relates to the possible instability of the behavioural relations 
over time. Ideally, the behaviour of an agent in the model is described as the result of the 
restricted optimization problem that he faces. Thus behaviour can be derived from preferences, 
institutions and technology, in a way which makes the behavioural relations invariant under 
changes in the rest of the model. This answers Frisch’s call for autonomous relations, discussed 
above. It also answers the famous Lucas critique: Lucas (1976) argued that often some model 
parameters are unlikely to be invariant under policy change, and hence the model cannot be 
used to assess the effects of a policy change. In the ideal model, any change in policy regime 
will affect the restricted optimization problem only through changes in the exogenous variables 
and can be handled correctly. Even then, we have no assurance that preferences and technology 
 
10 See Turner et al. (1989) for an insightful account of how macroeconometric models are used in practice to evaluate 
different types of policy proposals, creatively handling various difficulties that one encounters along the way.  
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are sufficiently stable over time to allow us to use the model for establishing an optimal policy 
for the future. And, of course, in practice the stylized pictures that we use cannot live up to the 
ideal. Hence our models are unreliable for a number of reasons, as the behavioural relations are 
based on imprecise estimates and may suffer from various types of instability. 
Another imperfection in actual models is particularly relevant to their use in policy 
optimization. Many model relations can claim only local validity, because they have been 
derived as local approximations to more complex and usually unknown global relations. In an 
optimization exercise, technically the optimum may well lie outside the local area of 
reliability.
11  For example, in an optimization exercise I did almost two decades ago with a 
linearized version of the CPB macro model of that time, the technical optimum implied an 
abolition of social security premiums paid by employers and a raise in the VAT by the same 
amount (Don, 1986a). This was the result of a small incongruence in tax shifting parameters in 
the wage equation, which may well hold true for small changes but is unlikely to remain valid 
for the large shift suggested by the technical optimum. This is the type of misleading result that 
Tinbergen hoped to exclude by adding proper boundary conditions. 
 
While a large empirical macroeconomic model is highly useful for coping with complexity and 
for ensuring consistency and accountability, it is necessarily incomplete, uncertain and often 
only locally valid. The model is best used as a valuable partner in the discussion. This partner 
has a lot of patience, an excellent memory and superior computing skills. Surprises in model 
results can mean a lesson for the model users, but more often indicate an error in the model 
code or input data. To cope with its limitations, the professional user must be creative, focussed 
and future-oriented. One should not have blind faith in the model results, but always question 
their validity for the problem at hand. 
Technical optimization of large empirical models tends to yield useless results. Hence, in 
practice, policy choice proceeds by trial and error.
12  Policy makers suggest a particular 
combination of instrument values, which is analysed and translated into model input by the 
professional model user. The model results are supplemented by the expert and translated for 
the policy makers. The report is likely to lead to analytical questions and a discussion between 
policy makers and experts, both on the quality of the analysis and on possible improvements of 
the policy proposals. A revised policy is then submitted to the experts for a fresh analysis. 
 
So Frisch was certainly right in worrying about the unreliability of the model relations. And 
yes, part of the answer is performing a trial-and-error procedure. But stripping the model of all 
 
11 Or, as Bray et al. (1995, p. 997) put it: “In practice, what tends to happen with an empirical macromodel is that there will 
be some odd quirk in the model, an odd nonlinearity, a corner solution or even an extreme assumption such as rational 
expectations which the optimal policy rule is able to exploit.” 
12 According to Johansen (1977, p. 153), a book by Jöhr and Singer (1955) refers to intuition and judgement combined with 
a trial and error procedure as the superior method which solves the problem in practice, in spite of the fact that a complete 
formalization would involve almost insurmountable difficulties.  
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its behavioural relations does not really help. A study by the Dutch Scientific Council for 
Government Policy followed Frisch’s suggestion to select target values in an optimization 
exercise ignoring the behavioural relations (WRR, 1987). This study showed that technically 
there was scope for higher growth, lower unemployment and less environmental damage than 
the CPB analyses of that time tended to suggest. Indeed, just observing technical input-output 
relations and not worrying about the price elasticity or composition of final demand, one could 
come up with a specialization pattern yielding high growth and low environmental damage. 
However, after this selection phase the Council did not really succeed in finding a set of 
policies that would make it happen (the implementation phase). Barring a full fledged Soviet 
type planning system, it did not give a clue on the type of policy, if any, that would be needed 
to steer the economy towards the technical optimum.
13  CPB’s empirical behavioural relations 
may well have been too restrictive for finding the best possible policy. Creative ideas on how to 
overcome particular restrictions and expand the set of reachable targets cannot be delivered by 
the model, but must come from policy makers and experts. An optimization with fewer 
behavioural restrictions may give inspiration for generating creative ideas, but ignoring all of 
them does not really help. 
As Klein observed, “(e)conomic policy is as much directed towards changing the constraint 
system as it is towards searching for exogenous variable configurations within a given control 
system” (Klein 1983, p. 160). It leads him to commend “the econometrician’s traditional way of 
implementing system results for policy purposes. Instead of looking for the optimum, he studies 
various simulations with changing instruments, changing parameters, and changing equation 
specifications until he finds improved or possibly target value solutions. This is a more flexible 
procedure than formal search for the optimum in a given constraint system” (Klein 1983, 
p.160). 
3.2  Getting to know the welfare function 
If only for lack of technical skills, policy makers are unlikely to provide the expert with a well 
defined welfare function. In practice, preferences are formed and specified in the course of a 
trial-and-error procedure like the one I described in the previous section. When confronted with 
the likely outcome of a concrete policy proposal, policy makers will not only look for a better 
set of instrument values but also come up with additional targets or conditions that must be 
observed. The expert also has a role to play here. He should make sure that the report on the 
likely outcome of a concrete policy proposal is complete, i.e. that it contains information on all 
variables that might be relevant to the policy maker. For instance, if an income distribution 
target is proxied by a particular ratio of quantiles, any special impact on other quantiles should 
be reported so that it may be added to the list of targets if the policy maker cares about it. “No 
pain, no gain” is a useful rule of thumb: if a revised policy proposal yields an improvement on 
 
13 For critical reviews of the WRR study, see Don (1986b) and Fase (1987).  
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some target, a price is likely to be paid on some other target. If this price is not immediately 
identified, the expert should go and look for it, possibly by expanding the list of targets. 
The trial-and-error process constitutes an interaction between the policy maker and the 
model-cum-expert system. This interaction is crucial in getting messages across in two 
directions. It is how the policy maker learns about trade-offs between different targets and the 
feasibility of particular combinations of target values. It is how the expert learns about the 
relevant list of target variables and the weights attached to them. In the course of the exchange, 
different types of discussions will come up. The policy maker will question the limitations of 
the model and ask for model validation, model extensions or supplementary analyses. The 
expert will elicit the exact political targets and weights. If the process is cooperative and open-
minded, together they will engage in a creative process to find new types of instruments that 
enlarge the set of feasible targets by moving the various trade-offs away from the origin. Such 
new instruments may lie outside the immediate scope of the model, and include what Tinbergen 
called “qualitative policies”. 
So Tinbergen was certainly right in worrying about the identification of the welfare function. 
And yes, part of the answer is performing a trial-and-error procedure. But choosing fixed targets 
for optimization and subsequently adding constraints does not really help. Of course, an 
optimization exercise with fixed targets may help to illustrate what type of solution could be 
available. Often adding constraints will indeed be necessary to avoid useless results outside the 
local area of model validity discussed above. But getting to know the welfare function requires 
some way of tracing the relevant trade-offs between targets and getting feedback from policy 
makers on the positions they prefer. This does not require technical optimization but is readily 
accomplished by the trial-and-error procedure outlined above. 
 
Interestingly, there are ways to recover the welfare function from the policies that finally are 
advocated, or indeed decided. Aslaksen and Bjerkholt (1985) studied the preferences implicit in 
long-term strategies for depletion of Norwegian oil reserves. Brandsma et al. (1988) studied the 
preferences implicit in an illustrative macroeconomic policy package designed by CPB (1986). 
In order to get plausible results both studies had to account for risk aversion related to the 
uncertainty in the baseline scenario.  
3.3  Handling uncertainty 
The baseline scenario usually is a macroeconomic forecast based on the assumption that current 
policies are unchanged. It serves as a reference scenario for discussing the effects of alternative 
policy options. Policy makers readily understand that the baseline scenario is characterized by 
major uncertainties. Their asymmetric loss function, discussed in section 2.3 above, may lead 
them to consider a cautious scenario, or more precisely a scenario which holds a stronger policy  
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challenge, rather than a central forecast. This has indeed been standard practice since 1994 for 
preparing budgetary policies in the Netherlands. Yet it has not been applied to other policy 
fields, if this would mean using different scenarios for different policy questions; see Don 
(2001a) for a discussion. While this particular usage of scenarios may be typical for the Dutch 
situation,
14  one may also achieve the same result in less formal ways. 
While forecast uncertainty in macroeconomics is dominated by the uncertainty in exogenous 
variables and error terms in behavioural equations (Don (1994)), the major sources for 
uncertainty about estimated policy effects are the model specification and the model 
parameters. If uncertainty about policy effects is derived only from the estimated standard 
errors of the parameter estimations, the results will be misleading. On the one hand, the 
estimated standard errors understate the true uncertainty because they are only valid on the 
assumption that the model specification is correct. As Wallis (1993, p. 126) put it, “no measure 
of uncertainty that surrounds the choice of (the underlying view of the world) is available.” On 
the other hand, the estimated standard errors may well overestimate the true uncertainty because 
they can only reflect the inaccuracy of the parameters in the context of the sample used for 
estimating them, whereas in most cases other sources of knowledge have gone into the choice 
of the parameter values used in the policy model. As Tinbergen (1954, p. 242) observed, “the 
uncertainty margins obtained (from statistical reliability measures) are often wider than the 
uncertainty margins that our economic judgement would give us”. 
In principle, one could set up a Bayesian analysis that takes proper account of the various 
sources of uncertainty. However, this is highly impractical, especially in the context of a large 
real world policy model.
15  In practice, one hardly gets beyond a well chosen set of sensitivity 
analyses, following the example of Tinbergen (1952). This is far from satisfactory, indeed 
Turner et al. (1989) warn us that the interpretation of such analyses is essentially subjective. 
Perhaps the difficulties in assessing actual parameter uncertainty are an important obstacle in 
adjusting policy vigour to parameter certainty, in line with the analysis of Brainard (1967). In 
fact I think policy vigour tends to be determined by other considerations, ranging from 
primitive feelings that “something must be done” to sophisticated political strategies and the 
expected impact on public opinion. 
 
14 Dutch practice has even gained in sophistication since its description in Don (2001a). Don (2001b, section 7) explains how 
a probability statement is attached to the cautious scenario. 
15 Sims (2002) appears more optimistic on this issue, but notes that in practice so far one has used other methods, largely 
relying on subjective judgemental probability distributions.  
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4  What makes the theory useful 
So both Frisch and Tinbergen were right in their worries about the practical usefulness of their 
common framework for the theory of optimal economic policy, as summarized in (1). Realistic 
policy problems involve “large” models containing uncertain relations which may be too 
restrictive and often can claim only local validity. The welfare function describing the 
preferences of the policy maker is unknown and hard to identify. The suggestions Frisch and 
Tinbergen gave to cope with these problems tend to be of little help. Rather, an open interaction 
between policy maker and the model-cum-expert system can solve the policy problem using a 
straightforward trial-and-error procedure. 
What is left to make the theory useful? First, a crucial contribution is the set of concepts that 
the theory introduced. The distinction between target variables and instrument variables is 
central to any useful interaction between policy maker and expert. The same holds true for the 
concept of a welfare function describing the preferences of the policy makers and an 
econometric model describing the relations between instruments and targets. Second, the 
celebrated order condition provides a valuable intuition. That a policy problem may only be 
solved if the number of instruments is at least as large as the number of targets, is a condition 
which is easily communicated to the policy maker and proves very useful in the interaction. 
Third, the framework defines important role models for the two parties in the interaction.
16  The 
policy maker decides on political preferences (the welfare function) and chooses the policy that 
will be implemented (instrument values). The expert decides on the model relations (including 
additional restrictions or supplementary analyses) and determines the forecast for all other 
relevant variables, including the target values (conditional on the instrument values chosen by 
the policy maker). While each party can question the decisions of the other, these role models 
define the ultimate responsibilities that should be observed. 
4.1  Illustrations from recent experience in the Netherlands 
The role models are essential in the process of assessing the economic effects of different 
election platforms, which has been performed in the Netherlands in the run-up to general 
elections since 1986. For an in-depth discussion of the merits and drawbacks of this process, see 
the various contributions in the book edited by Graafland and Ros (2003). 
In the run-up to the 2002 elections no less than seven political parties asked to be part of the 
exercise, indeed comprising all parties then represented in parliament. Each party was quite 
happy with the results of the assessments. Apparently, the differences in estimated effects 
between the party platforms reflected the differences in political preferences (welfare functions) 
between the parties. Table 1 offers a good illustration. Because of the workload involved and 
the time constraint, the trial-and-error procedure could not have many steps. On the basis of the 
 
16 Cf. Johansen (1977), Section 2.5 (pp. 104-110).  
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published policy platforms, CPB asked parties to elaborate and specify their policy proposals. 
This requires the constructive cooperation of party officials. After a first trial assessment, the 
party was given the opportunity to adjust its policy package so as to obtain a better result. After 
this second trial, a third trial was allowed only to correct errors and misunderstandings.
17 
 
Table 4.1  Selection of estimated effects of two policy platforms 
  Progressive environmentalists 
(GreenLeft) 
Conservative liberals  
(VVD) 
Structural growth of GDP  -  + 
Equitable income distribution  +  - 
Public spending  +  - 
Structural budget balance  -  + 
Environment  +  - 
 
Source: CPB (2002). 
   
 
The role models require a clear demarcation of available instruments, because the policy maker 
decides on the instrument values and the expert takes responsibility for forecasting the other 
variables. In the current Dutch institutional context, this means that the wage rate cannot be 
considered an instrument, unless the policy maker declares his intention to change the relevant 
laws and take control of wages. It also implies that policy variables that are controlled either by 
international bodies or by local authorities cannot be considered as instruments for the purpose 
of assessing party platforms for national parliamentary elections. Part of the value of the 
exercise lies in the fact that the proposals for economic policy are made concrete and mutually 
comparable by means of a common baseline scenario and a standard reporting framework. The 
cabinet that was formed after the May 2002 elections broke up in October of the same year. 
New elections were held in January 2003, but because of time constraints CPB could not do a 
proper assessment of party platforms on this occasion. Thus we had a natural experiment on the 
value of such an assessment. The lack of it led to quite some confusion in the public debate on 
what the economic policies advocated by different parties actually implied. Only a week or so 
before the elections it transpired that the budget cuts advertised by one party were obtained by 
adding up the cuts in four consecutive years, while others only listed the impulse in the fourth 
year. In addition to such differences in definitions used, various claims about the effects on 
target variables such as employment and the government budget went unchecked. This left 
substantial scope for the delivery of hollow promises and the omission of unfavourable effects 
(Van Wijnbergen and Beetsma, 2003).  
 
Because no single party has a majority in parliament, after the elections two or more parties 
start negotiations to form a coalition cabinet. Both in 2002 and in 2003, the negotiating parties 
 
17 For a more detailed account of the procedure and the instruments used, see Don (2003).  
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called on CPB to support the search for an economic policy program that would best serve their 
preferences. Again, this took the form of a trial-and-error procedure. The negotiating parties 
submitted a trial policy package to CPB, which gave an assessment of the likely economic 
effects. More often than not, the results would not quite fit the preferences of the parties, thus 
prompting them to submit a new trial package, and so on. After the January 2003 elections, the 
first round of negotiations was between the two parties that had obtained the best results in the 
elections, the Christian Democrats (CDA) and the Social Democrats (PvdA). In the course of 
this process, it became clear that the targets they had set themselves could not be reached: it 
proved impossible to achieve a balanced budget by 2007 in the cautious scenario for the 
medium term without harming structural growth and employment and without violating various 
other political side conditions on the admissibility of instruments and on the income 
distribution. Efforts to find a feasible compromise failed and almost three months after the 
elections the negotiations between these two parties broke up. Next it took about four weeks for 
CDA to reach an agreement with the Conservative Liberals (VVD) and the Social Liberals 
(D66). 
What kind of messages did the model-cum-expert system send to the negotiating parties? 
The trial-and-error procedure revealed several trade-offs that the policy makers had to face. 
Achieving budget balance by 2007 in the cautious baseline scenario required substantial cuts in 
government expenditures and/or increases in tax rates. On average, these measures suffer some 
40% budgetary leakage because of their contractionary impact on the domestic economy. 
However, some measures suffer no leakage (e.g. reducing foreign aid) while other measures 
suffer high leakage (e.g. reducing government employment). Most expenditure cuts have only 
temporary contractionary effects because they do not hurt potential GDP growth, which is 
determined by structural productivity growth, labour supply and equilibrium unemployment. 
Indeed, some expenditure cuts, in particular in social security, may promote structural growth 
by stimulating labour supply and reducing equilibrium unemployment. On the other hand, most 
tax increases hurt structural growth by reducing labour supply and raising equilibrium 
unemployment. Again, some tax increases are less harmful than others, depending on how they 
affect total labour costs directly and through tax shifting. Unfortunately, some of the less 
harmful options for raising taxes met with a political taboo, in particular those related to the 
fiscal treatment of owner occupied houses. 
Of course, all the macroeconomic considerations have to be weighed against the more 
microeconomic impact of various types of government expenditures and tax changes. Also, the 
beneficial long term macroeconomic effects of government spending on education, 
infrastructure, health care, public safety and social security should not be ignored, even if such 
effects still elude quantitative assessment. 
These messages to the policy makers may all sound fairly straightforward, yet several 
elements were challenged in the public debate. More importantly, hardly anyone blamed CPB 
for the political choices made by the negotiating parties. The responsibilities of the politicians  
  24 
were clearly separated from those of the model-cum-expert system, in line with the role models 
laid down by Frisch and Tinbergen. Indeed, the opposition parties used the CPB assessment of 
the final coalition agreement to attack the political preferences of the new coalition 
4.2  Priorities for improvement in the Dutch case 
In the Dutch situation, the first priority for improving policy support certainly is to extend the 
scope of the analysis. Three types of expansion are in order. First, the direct temporary 
Keynesian effects of government spending should be supplemented with the indirect structural 
effects of the programs that the money is spent on, whether it is education, infrastructure, health 
care, or any other area of public concern. This is no easy task and one should not expect easy 
answers. The long term economic effects of any government program depend not only on the 
amount of money spent but even more on the quality of the program and the incentive structures 
it creates. Second, the border between quantitative policies and qualitative policies (and 
reforms) as defined by Tinbergen must be pushed further out. Since his days, we have made 
quite some headway by developing applied general equilibrium models that can assess 
institutional reforms in various fields, ranging from international trade to social security. Still, 
more remains to be done. But we should also remember Tinbergen’s warnings against 
speculation and bias where sound empirical evidence is lacking. Indeed, some types of policy 
cannot be analysed with quantitative models, e.g. “where the new policy is diffuse, with 
possibly wide-ranging macroeconomic consequences, being intended to promote broad 
structural change that cannot be quantified (…): (some) industrial policy proposals fall into this 
category.” (Turner et al. (1989), p. 104). One may want to try and use more qualitative cost-
benefit-type of analyses to study such reforms, e.g. new regulations for competitive market 
structures. Third, there are always some specific weak spots in the current system of models 
that require attention. Looking at our recent experience, we lacked good estimates of cross-
border tax evasion and asset price formation in relation to capital income taxes and asset taxes. 
As a second priority, I think we should find a proper way to determine and communicate the 
uncertainty that is inevitably attached to our policy analyses. While communicating uncertainty 
to policy makers should not be taken for granted, determining the relevant uncertainty comes 
first.
18  This is much more difficult for policy analyses than it is for forecasts, if only because in 
policy analysis we have no equivalent of ex post measured forecast errors. Several practical 
problems were mentioned in section 3.3 above. Graafland (2003) suggests some steps forward, 
but these do not address all difficulties and tend to be rather subjective. Still, an assessment of 
the uncertainty attached to our policy analyses would prove very valuable, both for informing 
our clients and for deriving priorities for empirical research.  
 
18 In Don (2001a) I discussed the determination and communication of uncertainty in macroeconomic forecasts.  
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5  Conclusions 
Any real world macroeconomic model used to support policy choice can claim only limited 
reliability. It is necessarily incomplete, sometimes ill suited for the problem at hand and often 
only locally valid. By implication, a mechanical optimization procedure to find the best 
economic policy is likely to be misleading, if not entirely out-of-order. Yet the model can be 
very helpful in assessing the likely consequences of different policy options, provided it is used 
by knowledgeable experts, who are well aware of the limitations of the model at hand and can 
contribute creative ideas on handling any shortcomings of the model in a particular policy 
analysis. The interaction between the policy maker and the model-cum-expert system then takes 
the form of an iterative trial-and-error procedure. This procedure can also cope quite naturally 
with the lack of knowledge on the welfare function. Policy makers submit policy proposals they 
hope will give them a better result. Helped by his model(s), the expert returns an analysis of 
likely effects. Next there is likely to be a serious discussion on both the merits of the economic 
analysis and the options for improving the policy from the perspective of the policy makers. 
There is no need for a better type of method here. 
In the Dutch case, the first priority for improvement is in extending the scope of the models. 
In particular we need sound estimates of the structural economic effects of government 
programs in education, infrastructure, health, etc. In addition, we should work on models suited 
to evaluate more policy options in changing institutions. A second priority is to get a better grip 
on the uncertainty inherent in any particular piece of policy analysis.  
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